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Abstract 
 
Social and Political Conflict Over Dam Development 
on the Irrawaddy River 
 
Kelsey Ann LeNeave, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  David Spence 
 
After decades of troubled economic, political, military, and social history, Myanmar is 
currently engaged in seven China-backed dam building projects, that will permanently 
alter the the Irrawaddy River, the country’s largest river. The Irrawaddy dominates the 
ecology of 61% of the total landmass, as well as the socioeconomic climate, given the 
fact that this area currently is home to nearly half of Myanmar’s population of 55 million 
people. 
Through sociopolitical analysis, this paper examines the effects of dam 
development along the Irrawaddy River and the corollary potential social, economic, and 
political repercussions anticipated throughout the region. Presenting the current status of 
the river as the spine of this small nation (slightly smaller than the state of Texas), the 
author provides data detailing manner and degree to which the dams will alter, 
irretrievably, the river’s role as a means to livelihood, food supply (fish, herd animals and 
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agriculture), and major transportation waterway, currently stretching 2,170 km (equal to 
the distance from Dallas, Texas to Washington, D.C.). 
This paper takes a detailed look at the relocation requirements and the impact on a 
broad range of resources are reviewed.  The dams are anticipated to result in massive 
deforestation, unsustainable fishing practices, destruction of key habitats, cessation of 
mineral prospects, and changes in land at the dam sites and across the margins of the 
river’s altered course.  
Myanmar seeks to establish hydroelectric power as its only power source by 
2030. Yet, as the data clearly show, other aspects of the risk/reward ratios emerge in the 
project’s evolution.  Myanmar currently is one of the most impoverished and 
underdeveloped countries, with socioeconomic gaps among the widest in the world. The 
dam projects are certain to further exaggerate these disparities. The paper takes up a 
discussion of these issues, both from historical and future-oriented viewpoints. 
Antecedent to the scope of this paper, the author calls for further analyses using a 
range of robust socioeconomic models to assess future hydroelectric harvesting projects 
in underdeveloped countries which divert these hydroelectric resources to mega-power 
nations, with specific attention to the impact on resources, population relocation, and 
political/economic/social implications. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Myanmar and Its Greatest River 
Located within Southeast Asia, the country of Myanmar (formerly known as 
Burma until 1989) is one of the least developed countries in the world with the widest 
range of ethnic diversity (CIA). It shares a 2,100-km boundary with China on the 
Northeast side of Myanmar (Weatherby 2012). The country covers 677,000 km2 of 
land – slightly smaller than the state of Texas – with a population of nearly 55 million 
people. The Irrawaddy River, also known as the Ayeyarwady River, is located fully 
within the national boundaries of Myanmar and, currently, is one of the only major 
rivers in Asia that remains undammed on the main channel.  
The Irrawaddy River flows approximately 2,170 km (the distance from Dallas to 
Washington D.C.), from its source point at the confluence of the N’mai and Mali 
Rivers (originating in the Himalayas), to the end of its journey in the Gulf of 
Martaban within the Andaman Sea (Figure 1). Over that distance, the Irrawaddy holds 
approximately two-thirds of the entire surface water volume for the country 
(Kravtsova et al. 2008). The basin of the Irrawaddy encompasses 60% of the total 
land area of the country with nearly 26 million people, nearly half of Myanmar’s total 
population, currently residing within the basin area.  By all measures, the Irrawaddy 
River is Myanmar’s most valuable social and economic resource.  
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Figure 1: Map of Myanmar (CIA) 
 
No consideration of the country and its resources is complete without an 
understanding of the socioeconomic aspects and the further implications of river issues 
directly impacting the life and well-being of the population.  As the least developed 
country in the region, Myanmar is calculated to have a Human Development Index (HDI) 
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of 0.556 for its ranking of 145 out of 188 countries (UNDP; figure 2). The significance of 
Myanmar’s current status of underdevelopment is particularly significant given the fact 
that growth and technology developments have less impact, or worst case, often 
sometimes greatly exacerbated disparities, in countries with high existing levels of 
inequalities (Dabla-Norris 2015). Myanmar currently is in a state of great impending 
changes and inherent threats from the potential implementation of major dams, escalating 
deforestation, unsustainable fishing practices, changes in land use, destruction of key 
habitats, and mineral prospecting (Simmance 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: HDI ranking for Myanmar in 2016 (UNDP 2016) 
 
The government is pursuing an overarching goal of making hydropower the 
premier and eventually the only source of power, by 2030 with the potential to sustain 
40,000 MW (Simmance 2013). Yet, notable in goal and in these figures is the fact that 
Myanmar has one of the lowest levels of electricity consumption within the world as well 
as among developing countries at 165 kWh per capita (Hennig 2016). The overlying 
reasoning behind the proposed implementation of six dams along the upper tributaries of 
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the Mali and N’mai Rivers that feed into the Irrawaddy River and the major Myitsone 
dam at the confluence of the Mali and N’Mai rivers, is specifically that of meeting all of 
Myanmar’s national needs, while exporting up to nine times its own needs to the highly-
developed industrialized nations in the region, most notably to China (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Map of the seven proposed dams along the Irrawaddy River (KDNG 
2009; Simmance 2013) 
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1.2 Proposal  
Myanmar is home to some of the largest and most controversial endeavors in the 
area of hydropower (Hennig 2016). The impact of these dam projects along the 
Irrawaddy River – seven proposed to date – cannot be underestimated. From multiple 
perspectives, the overall socioeconomic, political, agricultural, and resource-destabilizing 
consequences are staggering. These factors, taken individually and in the aggregate, are 
the focus of this study. 
The appropriation of the great river of Myanmar will irretrievably determine the 
course of the indigenous population, nearly half of whom depend on the river's course as 
it now exists.  While the export of 80-90% of the hydropower from these proposed dam 
projects greatly constrains Myanmar’s future, the dam projects themselves bring other 
challenges and potentially-destabilizing unknowns, all of which greatly limit Myanmar’s 
opportunities for decreasing inequalities, increasing political stability or promoting 
advancement beyond its undeveloped status.   
Not only is the anticipated 80/20 or 90/10 hydroelectric export ratio poised 
specifically to deny Myanmar the opportunity to lay claim to 80-90% of its own 
hydropower resources, but distribution of this new wealth is likely to increase the great 
disparities – social, economic, political and educational – that currently exist, and further 
forestall any realistic bid to change its third-world status.  These factors of increasing 
disparities are not unique to Myanmar or to the appropriation of massive amounts of 
resource exports such as hydroelectric.  In the context of the Irrawaddy River and 
Myanmar’s current underdeveloped condition, we see ongoing challenges wrought by an 
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indigenous population that has been bound to the river and the adjacent land for its 
subsistence, whether for transportation and fishing, agriculture and food production or the 
products of its adjacent forests. Over generations, these factors have kept the population 
surviving (at the margins of the birth and death-rate curves), and exhibiting classic 
features of subsistent population with minimal education.  
Not surprisingly, these disparities either will be left unaffected/unimproved or, by 
nature of dislocation and disruption, be exacerbated.  Impacts of disparities arise 
simultaneously from the inequality of outcomes (wealth, income or expenditure) as well 
as the inequality of opportunities. These macroeconomic factors present us with the 
question of who directly benefits from the wealth-producing activities and for whom the 
opportunities either expand or contract (Dabla-Norris 2015).  As often noted by multiple 
sources, the rising influence of the rich and the stagnant or diminishing conditions of the 
poor have causal effects on crises and, thereby, curtail short- and long-term growth 
(Dabla-Norris 2015; UNDP 2014; Pasquali 2012). 
As we examine the wide-ranging changes and the potential economics of the dam 
projects along the Irrawaddy, the question naturally follows as to 1) who is likely to 
benefit from the power-generating economics of the dams and/or the financial benefits 
from the export of large percentages of hydroelectric power (export estimates between 
80-90%), and 2) if the export-generated revenues or dam-related technology would offset 
local losses by local gains, thereby counterbalancing the economic threats to the people 
adversely effected, those whose livelihoods and survival are derived from the river 
commerce, the adjacent agriculture or the fishing.  An overarching principle relevant to 
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this question is the fact that dams and hydroelectric power, by their technical 
sophistication, involve high technology and technology growth. On the economic stage in 
any underdeveloped nation, high technology, in any sector, increases joblessness for all 
skill levels (Leung 2015). Heightened concern for Myanmar includes the fact the 
macroeconomic reality that inequality harms overall growth and worsens the chance of 
reducing poverty, factors which combine to present a lasting threat to long-term social or 
economic development (UNDP 2014).  
Countless other undeveloped countries have preceded Myanmar in similar 
situations when conquering, colonial or more developed, self-serving powers have 
introduced higher technologies while laying claim to and exporting natural resources for 
their own gain. We have seen this situation numerous times before with other resources 
as the target: the oil curse, gold, land, lumber, and nearly all plentiful, desirable resources 
that present themselves. Now we are seeing it with hydroelectricity.  
Not only will building dams fundamentally alter 61% of the land and reassign 
nearly half of the population to unfamiliar locations and unknown reconfigured 
environments, but the act of exporting 80-90% of the newly-produced hydroelectricity 
will put a hard ceiling on the further development on this region. To understand the full 
picture, one must examine the region in its entirety: its people and their indigenous 
culture, its climate, land use, struggles with deforestation, agricultural influence, and the 
geomorphology of Myanmar’s highest water discharging and most expansive river, the 
Irrawaddy. 
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Chapter Two: The Region 
2.1 Climate of Myanmar 
To appreciate the impact of the dams of Myanmar, it is imperative to evaluate the 
climate of the region as this dominates the surrounding productivity of farmlands, water 
availability, seasonal growth cycles and other life-sustaining resources and processes.  As 
a country Myanmar exhibits high variance dependent on two significant factors: 
geographical location and time of year.   In terms of precipitation and climate variances, 
Myanmar can be divided into five distinct homogeneous geographic regions: North, 
South, East, West, and Central Myanmar (Sen Roy et al. 2000; Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Homogeneous Regions of Myanmar (Sen Roy et al. 2000) 
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These regions differ primarily in fluctuations caused by the El Nino Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) events. The PDO consists 
of lengthy warm and cold phases that are not constrained to any singular decade of time, 
but rather can span several decades. With the presence of the PDO, there is a resulting 
amplification in the effect of the warmer phase of ENSO (Sen Roy et al. 2011). Simply 
stated, the climate effects compound each other. Climatologists liken this to a warm 
tropical period. An example of this would be the reported 10% decrease in precipitation 
in all regions of Myanmar during the El Nino years (Sen Roy et al. 2011). However, there 
is an overall “modulating effect” on the monsoonal precipitation across the country, with 
a larger effect throughout the colder phases of the PDO, and more specifically within the 
reaches of southern Myanmar. This observation compels a more detailed account of the 
rainfall of Myanmar (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Annual Rainfall Distribution for Myanmar (mm) (FAO 2009) 
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Myanmar has three different tropical climatic seasons: a rainy season from mid-
May to mid-October, a cool winter season from mid-October to mid-February, and a hot 
summer season from mid-February to mid-May. The rainy season from May to October 
brings approximately 75% of the total annual rainfall for the country of Myanmar (Sen 
Roy et al. 2000). During the month of August, the country sees its highest levels of 
rainfall: approximately 1,790mm as a yearly average over a 33-year period) and in July 
just slightly lower levels.  
By contrast, the more localized area of the Irrawaddy region averages 
approximately 580mm in the month of August (Sen Roy et al. 2000). There is also 
notable variance in precipitation levels between the central and the coastal zones of the 
country, ranging from the smallest averages of 600mm to 1400mm in the central zone, to 
the maximum of 4000mm to 5600mm in the coastal zone. However, the precipitation 
levels typically lean to maximum amounts near the western coastal region and in northern 
Myanmar (Sen Roy et al. 2000). 
 
2.2 Rivers and Mangrove 
In addition to the Irrawaddy, Myanmar is laced with a vast number of river 
networks: the Salween River, the Chindwin River, Sittaung River, Shweli River, and 
Yangon River, to name a few.  Mangroves are characterized by densely-populated tree 
and shrub growth, characteristically marked by large tangled root structures that protrude 
above the water. Tidal areas are pools of highly-fluctuating water levels that possess high 
salinity levels due to water evaporation. Mangroves are one of the most important 
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vegetation elements within tropical river deltas. Mangroves provide stabilization factors 
due to sediment trapping, along with assisting in the formation and further stabilization of 
sand bars in the shallow waters; mangroves also provide overall protection from large 
storms (Hedley et al. 2009). In addition to these delta mangroves stabilizing and 
preventing soil erosion, the mangrove systems surrounding the banks of the Irrawaddy 
River produce fuel wood and charcoal (Oo 2001).  
Despite these strong positive attributes of mangrove systems that maintain 
environmental stability, mangroves are facing steady decline as humanity continues to 
overtake natural resources for other uses. The Irrawaddy basin is particularly vulnerable 
to accelerated mangrove forest decline as reflected in increased agricultural use for rice 
production, as well as the harvesting and clearance of mangrove forests. This mangrove 
decline has the further potential to seriously affect the vulnerability of the region in terms 
of stark economic change due to loss of fisheries in addition to river stability itself, as 
reflected in change of sediment load, flow variations, and water quality.  
In the 71-year period, 1924-1995, the mangrove population decreased by nearly 
25%, from 2345 km2 to 1786 km2 (Oo 2002; Hedley et al. 2009). Near the floodplains of 
the Irrawaddy River, there are no less than 29 different areas of associated delta 
mangrove species, making it one of the largest mangrove forests in Asia (Oo 2001). 
However, despite the impressive coverage, the Irrawaddy mangroves continue being 
heavily cleared and drained specifically to accommodate other uses of the land, all of 
which are contrary to mangrove growth as the human population encroaches on both the 
river and its banks of mangrove forests 
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2.3 Deforestation 
When analyzing implications involved in dam building, it is important to note a 
more current status of deforestation in the region as the transition from forested land to 
agricultural and industrial land are the two main contributing factors for an increased rate 
of deforestation (CEF). Poverty, dense population distribution (such as relocation), and 
unequal land access are known to be the main underlying accelerators for man-made 
deforestation rates (CEF). Deforestation can be defined as the conversion of forested land 
to non-forested land and has the immediate impact of creating an ecological imbalance 
and a decline in biodiversity (CEF). 
A large part of the deforestation rate as well as the degradation of forests is 
attributed to the extraction of natural resources, specifically in commercial pursuit of 
fuelwood and other forestry products. This factor is particularly prevalent in the region of 
Popa Mountain Park (Htun et al. 2012). Furthermore, as Myanmar’s forests decrease, 
charcoal production, logging, and plantation development are on rise – all of which 
cumulatively taxes and extends the environmental degradation in process in the 
Irrawaddy delta region (Leimgruber et al. 2005; Figure 7). Myanmar’s deforestation rates 
tops out at approximately 47% as of 2010, declining from 49% in 2005 (Htun et al. 2012; 
FAO 2010).  
Despite the slight 2010 decline, Myanmar still retains one of the highest 
deforestation rates for any tropical environment. The exact rate of slowed, continued, or 
growing deforestation will inevitably fluctuate due to a multiplicity of varying factors 
ranging from natural to man-made influences. However, the sustained trend remains 
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prevalent: deforestation rates appear to stem from a quick increase in human population 
and the demand for natural resources.  
Another component of the deforestation trend, which is an additional contributing 
factor to the increase in deforestation rate, is evidence that within closed forests there has 
been a change from gentle slopes to more steep slopes (Htun et al. 2012). It is important 
to note that, while Myanmar faces decreases in forest coverage, the region retains its 
status as having some of largest forests in Southeast Asia (Leimgruber et al. 
2005).  Despite this fact, Myanmar as a microcosm has succumbed to a net forest 
coverage decrease of 9,000 km2 (0.2% annually) from the 1990s to the early 2000s 
(Leimgruber et al. 2005). Of these findings, there are a multitude of hotspots that have 
higher concentrated rates of deforestation within its borders.  
Two key hotspots are the Irrawaddy delta region with a deforestation rate of 2.2-
3.3% annually and the east bank of the River at 0.4% annually (Leimgruber et al. 2005). 
These examples of deforestation rates corroborate the fact that the mangroves near the 
Irrawaddy River have decreased 20% over a mere 10-year span (Leimgruber et al.2005). 
This is a strikingly large decline of mangrove forestation, over a single decade, that 
solidifies the briskly changing environment along the Irrawaddy banks.  
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Figure 6: Breakdown of Forest Types (Instituto Oikos et al. 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of Deforestation within Regions of Myanmar (Leimgruber et al. 
2005) 
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2.4 Agricultural Elements: Fishing and Farming 
To understand the composition of land and the role agriculture plays within the 
borders of Myanmar, one must examine land use. Myanmar land use is composed of 
three subcategories: agricultural land that accounts for 19.2% of land mass; forested land, 
48.2% and “other” at 32.6% respectively (CIA). Agricultural land is distinguished by 
four subcategories, comprised of arable land (16.5%), permanent crops (2.2%), and 
permanent pasture (0.5%), and the “other” category of land use that also contains the 
22,950 km2 of irrigated land (CIA). While agricultural land comprises nearly 20% of land 
use, Myanmar’s densely forested areas remain central to industry.  Covering almost 50% 
of Myanmar, one of the region's strongest economic tenants is timber production, 
solidifying forested areas as one of the most important sources of income (Htun et al. 
2012). 
Over the course of countless generations, the people of Myanmar both depended 
upon and have adjusted to the seasonal cycle that impact the river in terms of fishing, 
agriculture, and transportation. With the introduction of dams, the river’s seasonal cycles 
will be notably modified and require all those living off the land to greatly adjust their 
traditional way of life.  
 
2.5 Conservation Areas 
One must also note the importance of conservation and the relevant role it has in 
protecting the land, water, and the species which live in Myanmar. Between 1918 and 
2007, there have been 33 national parks and wildlife sanctuaries created (Sovacool 2012, 
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Simmance 2013; Figure 8). The creation and expansion of these conservation areas are 
not only significant in the protection of species diversity, but also aid to reduce and 
control deforestation (Htun et al. 2012). There are two conservation areas that are 
specifically geared towards the preservation of fish: the Binlangjiang Aquatic Germplasm 
Resource Protection Area and the Tongbiguan National Nature Reserve (Yang et al. 
2016). The Binlangjiang Area was started in 2008 and then resized in 2012 to spread over 
1343.5 hm2 around the Daying River with the intention of protecting the fish species 
within the Irrawaddy River.  
The Tongbiguan Reserve came about in 1986 and was combined with the Ruili 
River Nature Reserve around 2009, becoming an official reserve in 2013 and working to 
shelter endangered, rare, and endemic fish species (Yang et al. 2016). An additional 
conservation area is the Popa Mountain Park, centered around the only extinct volcano in 
Myanmar. Popa Mountain Park covers a span of 100 km2 and of that, 88.7% is masked by 
forests (Htun et al. 2012).  Of the forested region in the Popa Park conservation zone, the 
majority consists of dry mixed deciduous forest (Htun et al. 2012).  While all 
conservation activities are impressive movements to guard Myanmar's resources, the 
largest protection area within its boundaries is the Hukaung Valley Wildlife Sanctuary.  
This wildlife sanctuary established in 2001, now includes an extension added in 2004 
which brought the sanctuary area to a total of 22,000 km2 (Instituto Oikos et al. 2011). 
This area protects endangered tigers and threatened fowl. 
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Figure 8: Protected Areas in Myanmar (Lio 2015) 
 
 
2.6 Livelihood Along the River 
Myanmar has a population density of approximately 73 people per km2 with a 
majority of the population living on or in proximity to the Irrawaddy River (Simmance 
2013). Not surprisingly, the people of Myanmar depend heavily on the Irrawaddy in 
several ways. Boats move goods and services (products and people), while markets and 
fisheries depend on the daily catch. Additionally, surrounding lands depend heavily on 
irrigation for farming. 
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Chapter Three: The Irrawaddy River 
3.1 Delta Characteristics 
As is well understood in the geomorphology of rivers, river deltas are in a 
constant state of change due to the shaping and evolution they endure from the earth 
elements as well as the introduction of anthropogenic changes in land use.  By sheer size 
and flow and the fact that it collects two-thirds of the surface water of Myanmar, the 
Irrawaddy river delta earns its place as one of the major tropical deltas within the 
Southeast Asian region.  This considerable resource lends itself to the high human 
population as well as well-established agricultural uses surrounding the river. One cannot 
underestimate the Irrawaddy’s impact on the surrounding life.  
The wedge-shaped distributary Irrawaddy River delta is totally contained within 
the boundaries of Myanmar. The delta extends down to 640 km from the coast of 
Myanmar and has a catchment area of approximately 0.7 x 106 km2 (Robinson et al. 
2007).  The coastline of the delta has been stable since the mid-1800s and is progressing 
seaward at a rate of approximately 0.34 km per century (Hedley et al. 2009).  
Not only does the Irrawaddy basin house a vast area of unprotected wetlands, but 
the region itself has one of the highest population densities in Myanmar (Salmivaara 
2012). Wetlands provide incalculable benefits of environmental services that protect the 
river, its fish life, and other important habitats. High-population growth within the 
southern tropical rainforest lowlands coupled with the central dry forest lowlands create a 
sensitive and highly-vulnerable area within the basin, given accelerated population 
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growth estimates (0.73-0.89% between 2005 and 2050) and decline in forested area 
(Salmivaara 2012). The full human engagement on the river and its surrounding areas is 
evident, and provides compelling evidence for the importance of the river itself and the 
peril of deforestation, altering wildlife habitats, decreasing species, and increasing 
salinization of the bay in which the Irrawaddy feeds (CEF).  
All rivers are dynamic focal points of life; the Irrawaddy River, as one of the great 
rivers of Southeast Asia, is a preeminently important example. 
 
3.2 River Geomorphology 
The Himalayan Mountains form the head waters for the N’Mai and Mali Rivers 
which merge north of the town of Myitkyina to form the Irrawaddy River. The Irrawaddy 
River flows steadily through Myanmar over the course of 2,170 km at approximately 160 
meters above sea level with only miniscule change in elevation (approximately 8.4 
cm/km) from the head to the mouth in the Andaman Sea (Kravtsova et al. 2008). The 
basin of the river takes up around 60% of the entire country of Myanmar and extends 
1,500 km and spreads out over an estimated average width of 280 km (Kravtsova et al. 
2008; Figure 9).  
The maximum flow of the Irrawaddy River system begins in the summer 
monsoonal months when the Himalayan Mountains meltwater begins to flow (Kravtsova 
et al. 2008). During this period, the region sees its highest rainfall levels of the year and 
the span of months from July to September can account for 53% of the year’s total 
(Kravtsova et al. 2008). Its highest rainfall month is typically August at 18.2% and its 
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lowest being February at 2.2% (Kravtsova et al. 2008). This large difference in rainfall 
leads to much seasonal variation in the water flow regimes (Kravtsova et al. 2008), 
similar to that of other often-studied rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra Rivers 
(Kravtsova et al. 2008).  
 
Figure 9: The Irrawaddy River Basin (KDNG 2007) 
 
3.3 River Tributaries 
The Irrawaddy River is formed at the confluence of the N’mai and Mali Rivers. 
Five main tributaries located within the basin feed into the Irrawaddy south of this point: 
the Taping River, Shweli River, Myitnge, Mu River, and Chindwin River. An additional 
three main tributaries are located within the region of the Irrawaddy located in China; 
these include the Dulong River, the Daying River, and the Ruili River (Yang et al. 2016). 
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3.4 Sediment Fluxes 
The Irrawaddy River carries the fifth-largest suspended load of sediment (265 MT 
yr -1) and the fourth-highest dissolved load among the world's largest rivers (Robinson et 
al. 2007). Give the fact that the useful life of a dam is directly proportional to the 
accumulating speed of sediment deposition behind the dam, the life expectancy and 
engineering of any dam on the Irrawaddy must take the suspended load of sediment into 
account. Moreover, engineers and dam specialists must pay special additional to sediment 
fluxes. As high sediment accumulates behind a dam, the build up can weaken the dam. 
Equally significant, with sediment trapped behind the dam, lower sediment supply 
dramatically compromises the subaqueous delta areas in front of the dam (Bangqui Hu et 
al. 2009). These conditions are known to create a series of profound morphological, 
ecological, geological changes in the estuary, delta, and coastal sea (Bangqui Hu et al. 
2009). 
Delivered from the Himalayan Mountains down to the Gulf of Martaban, the 
Irrawaddy River water and sediment, along with the corresponding understanding that 
comes with it (e.g. characteristics, fluxes, mineralogy), coincides with the tectonic uplift 
impact on “biogeochemical cycles,” as well as anthropogenic effects on sediment yields 
and fluxes (Robinson et al. 2007). Following the monsoonal climate and rainfall patterns, 
during the rainy season from around June to November, the river drains the majority of 
its sediment discharge (92%) as well as its water volume (80%) (Hedley et al. 2009).  
The river carries mainly fine-grained sediments, however it is also quite effective 
at carrying larger-bulk sediments as well, which contributes to the progradation of the 
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coastline along the Gulf of Martaban (Hedley et al. 2009). In contrast to a majority of the 
world’s great rivers, the Irrawaddy has had a steady increase in the amount of sediment 
being delivered towards the Gulf of Martaban and in turn, the Andaman Sea, due to a 
lack of dams on the main channel as well as the effects of drastic increases in population 
and the associated changes in land use (Robinson et al. 2007). As compared to early 
original data on the fluxes within the Irrawaddy River by Gordon, the most recent study 
would otherwise state that that the past flux of 261 MT yr-1 is a strong miscalculation and 
that the sediment flux for the river is more along the lines of 364 ± 60 MT yr-1. These 
realities firmly situate the Irrawaddy River’s sediment measures as being the third largest 
sediment load in the world (Robinson et al. 2007).  
 
3.5 Aquatic Life 
Given origin, size, climate, and geography along the river, the Irrawaddy River 
and its tributaries boast high diversity of fish and aquatic life within this particular region 
of Southeast Asia. The Irrawaddy and its upper portions that extend north into China 
have a fish assemblage of 85 different recorded species within 8 orders, 20 families, and 
51 genera (Yang et al. 2016).  Out of the 85 assemblages, there were 76 indigenous 
species within 42 genera as well as 9 non-native species within 9 genera with 40 of these 
total species being completely native to the entire Irrawaddy basin (Yang et al. 2016). 
The river is also home to a rare species of dolphin, the Irrawaddy Dolphin. 
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Chapter Four: Social and Political Context  
 
4.1 Brief History of the Political System  
The country of Myanmar has undergone and, indeed, withstood vast changes in 
terms of its political realm: from asserting its independence from Great Britain in 1948, 
to becoming a military-led state, and later through transition from that of a military 
dictatorship towards National League for Democracy (NLD), a parliamentary republic, 
beginning in 1990 (CIA). During 1994, there were four different groups that came 
forward with strong political opinions: the military, the National League for Democracy, 
the New Democracy Movement, and the Armed Opposition (Smith 1994). The high 
variance in political and social opinion was and continues to the present. 
Military force within Myanmar has been a pressing issue throughout the 
government and parliament throughout history and the present-day. Myanmar’s history 
has been subject to issues of turmoil and unrest in terms of militaristic rule versus that of 
the newer democracy. However, under the NLD, Myanmar has been making greater 
strides to preserve the relationship with the governmental class of people and the general 
population as well as the sustainability of the country as a whole. As far as conservation 
goes, there have been 16 major laws created for the purpose of resource and ecological 
protection and sustainability from 1951 to 2006 (Sovacool 2012; Simmance 2013; Figure 
10). 
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4.2 Ethnicities and Religious Diversity  
The main religion throughout Myanmar is Buddhism (87.9%), but there is still a 
presence of Christianity (6.2%), Muslim (4.3%), Animist (0.8%), Hindu (0.5%), other 
(0.2%), and none (0.1%) (CIA). Myanmar consists primarily of the Burman ethnicity at 
68%, however, the other ethnic groups include the Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine 
(4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%), Mon (2%), and other (5%) (CIA). The array of 
ethnicities and religions within Myanmar is accompanied by a high variance in public 
opinions and thoughts.  This leads to higher levels of violence and turmoil amongst the 
people of Myanmar. There are differing public opinions among the general population 
and a large divide between the classes, lending the momentum and pressure to a great 
social divide and increasingly dramatic socioeconomic disparities across the region, even 
given the rural nature of Myanmar.  
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Figure 10: Policies and Laws Created for Sustainability in Myanmar (Simmance 2013) 
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4.3 Myanmar’s Economic Sector  
Myanmar is home to a high number of valuable natural resources that have caught 
the eye of foreign investors due to a closeness to markets and a young eager workforce. 
Investors are intrigued by the energy sector, information technology (IT), and food and 
beverages (CIA). From the 2013 fiscal year to the 2014 fiscal year, pledged investments 
in Myanmar grew from $4.1 billion to $8.1 billion (CIA). Myanmar as a whole is an 
agricultural-based country with 26.3% of the GDP being attributed to the agricultural 
realm and 70% of the labor force being involved in agriculture (CIA). However, 
approximately one-quarter of the population of Myanmar remains in poverty, making it 
one of the poorest countries within Asia. Given the reality of barely half of the population 
having access to power, there is a strong need for energy in this area. This energy gap 
makes the Irrawaddy Dam Project look both socially and economically favorable for the 
country of Myanmar.  
 
4.4 Foreign Political Involvement/Background, and Social Implications 
Neighboring to the northeast of Myanmar, the Chinese government is a proponent 
for its domestic companies within to invest in foreign markets through the “go out” 
policy. The “go out” policy entails the government and domestic companies going out 
globally and investing heavily into various markets that will provide an increase in a 
needed commodity (in this case, hydroelectricity) that is, then, transferred back to the 
mother country. China has invested heavily in hydropower projects throughout Asia. 
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China’s plan for the framework of the situation had a background following their foreign 
policy of:  
“We will enhance unity with other developing countries, deepen traditional    
 friendship, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, [and] sincerely help the other 
 developing countries achieve independent development by providing aid and 
 making investment and uphold their legitimate rights and interests as well as their 
 common interests,” (Weatherby 2012).  
True to this explicit policy position and economic interest, China is the most involved 
nation in the country of Myanmar and, moreover, the main party to the proposed 
construction and operation of dams along the Irrawaddy River.  China has supplied the 
majority of the funding in both designing and the construction of over twenty 
hydropower projects, within Myanmar. These hydropower proposals and projects are 
primarily focused on claiming  the resulting hydropower for China and in designing the 
exporting of the power, given the reality that these dams are engineered with the capacity 
to reroute energy back to the China. In the aggregate, the imported hydroelectric power 
thus derived is equal to the amount of energy produced by the famed Chinese Three 
Gorges dam.  
One of the biggest issues at play in the relationship between Myanmar and China 
is a relatively new and inherently-weak, inexperienced Myanmar government in contrast 
to the perennial powerhouse of China.  Myanmar’s position and political system may be 
considered weak given its structure as a fragmented system that relies heavily on local 
governments to enforce the rule of central government (Weatherby 2012).  Furthermore, 
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until as recently as 2010, Myanmar’s political system has historically been one of 
military rule, leaving the region unified but unstable (Weatherby 2012).  
Dam proposals began to take root just prior to the transition to elected rule of law, 
bringing with it fragmented and divided opinions and viewpoints. This unpredictable 
political landscape, ripe with a multiplicity of opinions, lent itself to China’s move to 
capture Myanmar’s most valued commodity – the Irrawaddy. China began to implement 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in which they fund and build the dam, followed by 
owning and operating for a specific time period, after which the ownership is transferred 
to the host country for the remaining longevity of the project (Weatherby 2012).  
While the waterways of Myanmar are an attractive investment, China bears 
minimal risk when it comes to the livelihood of the river, region, and people. China is 
one of the largest energy consumers in the world, and with that comes the search for 
more power – in every regard. With its large untapped source of water and its 
hydroelectric possibilities, Myanmar’s presence in the region made it an attractive and 
highly-vulnerable political regime as well as an area with a lower carbon footprint and 
low carbon energy source for China.  These factors made it easier for China to be 
Myanmar’s largest foreign investor (Reeves 2015).  
China does not just stop at hydropower; Myanmar is a source for oil as well. The 
recently-opened oil pipeline system from Myanmar to China (owned and operated by 
China National Petroleum Corporation) is said to be able to transport 442,000 barrels a 
day across the 771-km distance (Bloomberg 2017; Figure 11). As the dominant party in 
these agreements between Myanmar and China, the latter –driven by self-interest –is 
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more concerned about meeting China’s energy needs and less concerned about the future 
needs of Myanmar and its inhabitants (Higgins 2011).  
China’s mission of singular self-interest is codified and exemplified in the fact 
that the future Myitsone reservoir is located within ancestral grounds and has the 
dangerous capacity to flood an area that is equivalent to the size of Singapore and will 
potentially relocate large masses of people from their land (The Economist 2011). The 
Myitsone dam will, in fact, submerge both historical and cultural sites upstream from the 
confluence point (International Rivers 2011). Furthermore, the original estimates 
projected the Myitsone dam project to only relocate 2,146 people from five villages and 
move those particular people into model villages that would give them access to power 
and life supplies. However, to date, a total of 12,000 people (nearly six times the early 
estimate) from 63 villages have already been relocated.  In the final analysis, the 
Myitsone dam project is likely to force the relocation of more than 20,000 people –nine 
times the early estimate –who will be strongly affected (International Rivers 2011). 
Due to the location of the Myitsone Dam, the Kachin Independence Organization 
(KIO) has stated that the continued construction of the dam is likely to threaten the 
traditional livelihoods of the Kachin people – a state within Myanmar (International 
Rivers 2011). The aforementioned displacement of people disconnects farmer from farm 
and brings about higher rates of unemployment. The displacement factor coupled with 
increased foreign labor on or near the dam, has set in motion the reality of the 
disappearance of traditional jobs, directly affecting the Myanmar people, while at the 
same time, putting other project jobs in the hands of cheaper imported/relocated Chinese 
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labor. Therefore, while Myanmar’s land, its economy and its people suffer harsh 
consequences, Chinese workers, companies, and their economy are benefitting. 
China’s self-motivated tactics don’t stop at the disregard for ancestral lands or the 
displacement and safety if its inhabitants. China has also turned to the use of live-fire 
exercises near the border that send a message of dominance while also attempting to be 
sure that Myanmar’s instability (political, economic, militaristic, social, and divergent 
ethnicities) stays within its borders (The Economist 2016). This illustrates the clear 
message of China’s presence: China will achieve its goals while, at the same time, 
maintaining control of Myanmar’s most valuable resources. China has the largest claim 
to the resulting hydropower from the dam, receiving 80-90%, with the remaining 10% 
allotted to Myanmar (Ives 2017). Furthermore, according to The New York Times, there 
is not actually a grid that connects the Myitsone dam project to Myanmar’s greater cities 
and towns (Ives 2017).  
With growing unrest over China’s dominance with the region, China’s only 
incentive to promote peace or to listen to the home-country’s concerns is to maintain the 
utilitarian survival of the relationship. Yet to truly listen means to understand – and to 
understand means to respect the heritage and concerns of Myanmar.  Hardly China’s 
goal.  China’s efforts to monetize the Irrawaddy is currently suspended due to a rise in 
public distress for sustainability and the preservation of land and culture. But it remains a 
strongly-motivated work in progress.  
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Figure 11: Pipeline System from the Coast of Myanmar into China (The Economist 2016) 
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4.5 Stakeholders 
The people of Myanmar rightly have concerns regarding population displacement, 
environmental sustainability, and more importantly, Chinese economic expansion into 
Myanmar, as well as the impact of Chinese nationals immigrating in large numbers into 
northern Myanmar (The Economist 2011).  While there is longstanding sentiment 
regarding China’s presence and influence in Myanmar, these sentiments are amplified by 
the feeling of resentment and genuine fear that Myanmar was/is becoming just another 
Chinese province.  
Understandably, the major issue attending to the implementation of the dams 
along the Irrawaddy is the balance of power among the stakeholders involved. Currently 
$800 million of the $3.6 billion (estimated completion cost) has been spent for 
construction of the first of seven, the partially-completed Myitsone dam, of which China 
Power Investment Corporation (CPI) and Asia World Company (AWC) are the majority 
stakeholders in this project (Jiangtao 2016).  Furthermore, CPI has investors to satisfy 
which include pivotal China players such as the Three Gorges Dam Corporation and 
China Development Bank (Jiangtao 2016).   
A significant marker of the vastness and the high value of the Irrawaddy project is 
the fact that CPI, as the principle partner, created yet another entity, the Yunnan Power 
Investment Company, Ltd., in 2008 with the sole purpose of developing, constructing, 
and operating projects along the Irrawaddy River (International Rivers 2011).  The joint 
venture between the China Power Investment and Asia World Company is what made the 
operation of the dam possible, by establishing the management through the Burma branch 
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of the AWC and Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MOEP).  (International Rivers 
2011). In most cases, MOEP thus far has simply played the role of a shareholder in 
project investments.  
This state of affairs leaves MOEP and Myanmar in tenuous predicament, either in 
terms of cancelling the dam project or in the event that Myanmar chooses to resume the 
project under its own funding and control.  If MOEP and Myanmar completely cancel the 
currently-suspended dam project (construction halted 2011, by the military-backed 
transitional governments yielding to public pressure), they must repay the $800 million.  
Equally challenging is the path of resuming dam construction: Myanmar will owe a hefty 
$50 million, in interest alone, due and payable a full year prior to resuming construction 
(Ives 2017).   
From economic, as well as political and sociocultural perspectives, all present 
paths forward are fraught with grave difficulties.  If the dam projects are continued 
forward, it is highly likely that an even greater ideological division among an already 
divided country may well ensue, opening the potential for protests, riots, or even larger 
issues regarding the livelihood of the river. (Jiangtao 2016; Ives 2017).  
The pivotal question remains: Will Myanmar choose a sustainable river or a 
sustainable relationship with China? 
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Chapter Five: Foreign Investment 
 
5.1 Chinese Hydropower Investments 
 During 2015, China invested $102 billion into renewable energy sources, making 
China itself the top investor for renewables in the world (Frankfurt School - UNEP 2016; 
Figure 12).  As China’s second biggest trading partner, Myanmar itself enjoyed $1.6 
billion of Chinese investments from 2004-2010. During the same period, other highly-
active targets for Chinese investments included the following: Russia ($2.5 billion), 
Canada ($2.9 billion), United States ($3.4 billion), Singapore ($4.7 billion), South Africa 
($5.8 billion), Australia ($6.97 billion), British Virgin Islands ($13.9 billion), Cayman 
Islands ($27.3 billion), and Hong Kong ($139.5 billion) (Naidu-Ghelani 2012).  
Even a cursory analysis provides the perspective that China, once an isolated, 
self-contained sleeping giant on the world scene, is rapidly emerging as a world-class and 
aggressive international investor.  As a country, China has truly turned to investing its 
money into foreign markets that not only produce a high rate of consistent return but also 
provide solid opportunities to seek dominance, supply its energy needs, and access the 
trade relationships and specific goods or services that increase its status, its dominance 
and/or its livelihood. Although China invests relatively heavily in a multitude of 
countries around the world, a number of its top investment targets are more accurately 
categorized as peripheral, or less developed, countries or regions (Reeves 2015). In 
keeping with the investing policies of other world leaders, China has turned to investing 
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more heavily into developing countries, rather than developed nations (Frankfurt School - 
UNEP 2016). 
 
Figure 12: Global Investment in Renewable Energy in 2015 ($BN) (UNEP 2016) 
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Chapter Six: The Irrawaddy River Dam Project 
 
6.1 Background 
 Hydropower is the main source of energy in Myanmar (Figure 13). This 
power alone counts for 75.2% of the entirety of installed capacity, generating Myanmar’s 
standing within the top 20 in relation to the world comparison of hydropower (CIA). 
Luckily, the Irrawaddy sediment supply to its mouth, the Gulf of Martaban, is currently 
not heavily affected by the damming of the river. However, given the volume of proposed 
dams likely to be constructed, it is probable that the sediment supply would otherwise, 
when completed, begin to alter substantially over time.  
At this time there are no major dams on the main channel.  However, a series of 
embankments designed to protect agricultural land could potentially flood. The Myitsone 
dam that is set to be built and completed in 2018 on the confluence of the Irrawaddy and 
the Chindwin River and will have a 6000 MW capacity (Simmance 2013). Hydropower 
on the Irrawaddy varies from many situations because of the fact that the dams are 
funded heavily or fully by foreign donors such as, China. The interest of China in the 
development of hydropower along the Irrawaddy centers on the Chinese influence on 
economic growth and political balance in the region (Hennig 2016). The development of 
hydropower projects within large river basins that cross country boundaries has a plethora 
of effects on the region and within the home country, as well as the balance of local and 
foreign interests economically, policy and commerce on the river as a whole, including 
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upstream and downstream regimes, social and cultural balance if there is a multi-ethnic 
region, and resource control (Hennig 2016). 
 
 
Figure 13: Existing Dam Projects Along the Transnational Irrawaddy Basin (Hennig 
2016) 
 
 
6.2 Size 
Myanmar has the potential to reach a 40,000 MW hydropower capacity 
(Simmance 2013). The $3.6 billion and 6,000 megawatt Myitsone dam is one of the 
seven proposed dams on the Irrawaddy River and is set for a completion date in 2018 
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(Figure 14; Figure 15). The Myitsone dam is planned to export approximately 90 percent 
of all electricity produced to China. 
 
 
Figure 14: Approximate Timeline for the Myitsone Dam (International Rivers 2011) 
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Figure 14 (Continued): Approximate Timeline for the Myitsone Dam 
(International Rivers 2011) 
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Figure 15: Future Dam Projects Along the Transnational Irrawaddy Basin (Hennig 2016) 
 
 
6.3 Effects of the Dam Project 
Within the realm of the implementation of dams in Asia and especially within the 
Irrawaddy, one significant issue is that of the threat to species diversity. The addition of a 
dam on the river will automatically restrict the path of fish, as well as create reaches of 
the river promoting a lotic environment that fish may not be capable of thriving in (Yang 
et al. 2016). With the plan to design and build seven dams, there is a strong threat to the 
flow regime of the river, as well as to the ecology of the river (Simmance 2013). Given 
significant changes of the flow regime, numerous changes can likewise be expected to the 
floodplains, delta, and ecosystem around and within the immediate environment.  
Taking the specific example of the Myitsone dam, China – as the funding and 
technical source of the dam – gains control of the condition and circumstances of the 
entire Irrawaddy river, with immediate control over a majority of the population and 
livelihood of the people of Myanmar (Simmance 2013). Such as David attempting to tell 
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Goliath to wear different sandals, Myanmar’s weak central government will likely be 
incapable of dictating the conditions to China over the Irrawaddy dams.   
Flow dynamics such as daily flow and water velocity, as well as sediment loads 
for the Irrawaddy can be anticipated to be greatly affected due to stabilizing the dry and 
monsoonal seasons (Simmance 2013). One of the most dramatic aspects arising with the 
implementation of dams is the resettlement of a significant portion of Myanmar’s 
population.   
The large scale of the dams currently being proposed and constructed leads to 
major constraints on the flow regime for the Irrawaddy River, which has the potential to 
affect the flood pulse sizes, overall geomorphology of the river, sediment load, ecology, 
and much more. One of the biggest and most controversial features is that the proposed 
dams on the Irrawaddy River are a substantial distance from the demand sources, China 
and India, chief consumers of the hydropower which will be produced from the dams.  
This automatically means that the energy produced must travel a great distance, making 
the export journey vulnerable to network issues and potential setbacks (Hennig 2016). 
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Chapter Seven: Implications Involved in Dam Building: Economic, 
Environmental, and Social 
 
7.1 Irrawaddy Implications 
The Irrawaddy River acts as the spine of Myanmar.  Beyond its role as the major 
channel to transport goods and services, its waterways also provide necessary nutrients to 
all regions downstream. With the delta being home to 60% of all rice production in the 
country, flow changes are bound to adversely affect the water’s nutrients. Downstream 
sediments, both organic and inorganic, are dramatically altered, impacting the ecology, 
aquatic habitat, and water quality (Atkins). Such nutrient-deficient irrigation would result 
in steeply-reduced production, delivering serious economic losses that would impact the 
millions of farmers in the area (Burma Rivers Network 2008). The disconnect between 
the indigenous people of Myanmar and the governing classes, is strikingly exemplified 
by the lack of dialogue of the unintended consequences of these dam projects on the life 
surrounding the Irrawaddy River. Few of those making political decisions have their own 
lived experience of the river or of the people of Myanmar who glean their subsistence 
lifestyle around the seasonal river flows and fluxes. Any alteration of seasonal flows 
would decrease the rice farming opportunities that the people depend on. Although the 
Irrawaddy dams are not yet in commission, it is not too bold of a statement to state that 
they will alter the rice farming capabilities of Myanmar.  
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Grain would not be the only loss. Similarly, fisheries would be heavily affected 
by the lack of nutrients, plus the additional impediments of blocking of migratory routes, 
slight lowering of water temperatures, and alterations in the seasonal cycles that the river 
naturally takes (Burma Rivers Network 2008). The river is home to various migratory 
fish, of which, the indigenous people of Myanmar depend on for their livelihood. 
Introduction of dams will block their migratory routes and result in a decline in the 
populations of those fish, likewise decreasing livelihood and food supply of those 
dependent on the river. In addition, the region would likely face water shortages 
throughout, which would lead to further practical declines in terms of transportation of 
goods and services.  
On an even more alarming scale, when natural flows of water are restricted, salt 
water intrusions into the areas near and around the delta would take place.  These salt 
water intrusions have the capacity to flood upstream areas along the river, reaching a 
level of incursion as large as 260 km2, most of which is currently characterized as 
rainforest (Burma Rivers Network 2008). Some of the areas that are likely to flood are 
among the most biodiverse in the region and contain many endangered species, such as 
the Irrawaddy Dolphin. Aside from the effect of upstream flooding, salt water intrusion 
inhibits the river as a drinking water source, destroys current farming and irrigation 
strategies along the river, and effects the livelihood of the Irrawaddy Dolphin and other 
freshwater assemblages as they have known it.   
As in most populated regions around major rivers and rich delta basins, the threat 
of ecological damage has been a present and persistent issue along the Irrawaddy since 
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increased deforestation and industrialization began actively taking place on a large scale, 
in the recent past. The ecosystems and population near the river have also seen effects 
from water pollution, increased saline intrusion, and increased sandbanks (International 
Rivers 2011). With increased growth issues from the implementation of dams, the ability 
for the river to respond and accommodate to natural processes has dramatically 
decreased.  
Downstream regions are likely to see further heavy decreases in rice and other 
agricultural product production rates due to changes in water flows as well as a decrease 
in fish production as natural fish migration routes will end if the Myitsone dam is 
completed (International Rivers 2011). The regions near the confluence and the Myitsone 
dam have also seen direct geologic problems ranging from the collapse of a nearby tunnel 
to recent seismic events (International Rivers 2011). Experts and environmental agencies 
such as the Biodiversity and Nature Conservation Association (BANCA) have 
recommended that a possible way to decrease the negative effects of the Myitsone dam 
would be to diversify and expand the natural infrastructure; e.g., build two smaller 
hydropowered dams accompanied by two national parks that would provide additional 
precautionary measures to preserve, protect, and limit destruction of forests; rather than 
building one imposing 6,000 MW Myitsone dam (International Rivers 2011). 
As prefaced above, serious concerns abound for water levels, salt water intrusion, 
and sediment travel within the river. Among the impeding issues at stake in the future of 
Myanmar, sediment travel is perhaps the most pressing consideration. After any dam is 
built and commissioned, sediment begins to settle in the reservoir of the dam, which 
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causes the floor of the reservoir to rise incrementally and, correspondingly, decreases the 
carrying capacity of the particular dam over time. This is known for shortening a dam’s 
lifespan significantly. In the case of the Irrawaddy River, with a higher sediment load in 
transport, this factor predisposes all Irrawaddy dam reservoirs to higher rates of sediment 
settling and rising with its basin, along with the shortening of the lifespan of any dam 
under these conditions. Similar issues with sediment load were seen in the example of 
The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in China and its halting of nearly half of 
sediments and nutrients from progressing further downstream to the delta (Handwerk 
2006). These particular types of issues have led and continue to lead to major alteration in 
the geomorphology of the river, increased erosion in the delta and tidal regions, and other 
changes to the natural flow of the Yangtze River (Handwerk 2006).  
From the practical, time-limited perspective of Chinese investors, such aspects of 
a shortened lifespan is of little concern as Chinese ownership and operation of any 
commissioned dam on the Irrawaddy River is limited to 50 years – likely leaving 
Myanmar to acquire the dam in compromised, less-than-ideal working condition than is 
anticipated or projected by Chinese officials as the first-50-year benefits projected to their 
advantage. Unmistakably, the lowered life expectancy of the dam would mean less 
money, less power, and continually-diminished jobs for the people of Myanmar 
(Weatherby 2012).  Even when evaluating the immediate monetary benefit of a 
completed Myitsone dam, Myanmar would only realize 20% of the revenue and 10% of 
the hydropower, making not only the long-term benefit difficult to justify, but also calling 
into question the short-term value (International Rivers 2011). 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Features of the Resource Curse  
 In some ways, the Myanmar’s efforts to partner with foreign investors to 
develop the Irrawaddy River is like that of mineral-rich nations afflicted with the 
resource curse.  The term of “the resource curse” has evolved over many iterations of 
political, social and economic analyses regarding the involvement of developed nations in 
the redistribution of natural resources from an undeveloped country rich in mineral, oil or 
gas resources. This concept of resource curse effectively names those conflicts emanating 
from the untapped power of a great river.  By its potential as a clean, renewable power 
source, a great river - as sure as oil or gas reserves - ignites visions of dam projects 
designed to capture hydroelectric power, as in the case of China’s move to capture 
hydropower from dam systems on the Irrawaddy.  While hydroelectric power, by its 
nature, is renewable and extracted without diminishing the resource itself, the 
construction of dams (needed to capture and generate power from water discharge) are 
themselves highly invasive and intrinsically destructive of the geomorphology of an area, 
especially one as wide-ranging and expansive as the Irrawaddy basin.  Therefore, the 
concept of resource curse fits well as an analogous tool for analyzing and assessing the 
complexities of the Irrawaddy dam projects.   
The resource curse brings with it high rates of conflict and authoritarianism, along 
with low rates of economic stability and economic growth. This is because countries with 
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more natural resources are predisposed to military rule or outside investment. In 
undeveloped regions the presence of resource riches and the competition for resource 
control, internal or foreign, often incite conflicts which likewise slow progress.  
At its most fundamental level, the curse posits that countries rich in natural 
resources are more likely to struggle with social, economic, and political challenges 
(NRGI 2015). This is due to a multiplicity of reasons, but of particular interest in 
Myanmar’s case is internal conflict and foreign involvement. Reflected in Myanmar’s 
history of military rule, weak central government has led to conflict -- rule by strength is 
not considerate, but rather, inconsiderate and inconsistent.  Control of natural resources is 
a means to power that often includes a wide range of social, economic, and political 
challenges (NRGI 2015).  This is because countries with more natural resources are 
predisposed to military rule or outside investment. 
 
8.2 The Double Edged Sword 
 The Irrawaddy dam projects continue to follow the scenario of a double edged 
sword, alternately favorable or unfavorable, for a multitude of reasons. The reason being 
that the sustainability of the country, the people, and the river are at stake in this dam-
dominated perspective involving the relationship of Myanmar with China. Something 
that holds true in any of the scenarios surrounding the dam projects is that one of the 
principals is not going to be pleased with the outcome. 
 Presenting itself as an opportunity for the home country, China comes forward as 
an investor to many different countries, including peripheral countries, such as Myanmar, 
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in a way that promotes an economic growth and enhancement in some way for both or all 
parties involved.  
        With the presence of China so relevant to the current status of Myanmar, it is 
apparent that China has brought forth, or influenced in some regard, violence within 
Myanmar, illegal activities, a quicker degradation of the environment, and the 
exploitation of the resources contained in Myanmar (Reeves 2015). The economic 
network that China is working towards through its foreign relations and investments lead 
to disproportionate gains of all parties involved, including: economic increases, political 
involvement, and social gains, that all have a tendency to end with the larger straw in the 
hands of China (Reeves 2015).  The issue with this is that the way in which China 
approaches its foreign investments, just as with Myanmar, leads to a negative context 
amongst people in the home country. In the example of Myanmar, there was little to no 
communication or presenting or the projects with the people outside of government and 
military, along with the dam projects leading to relocation of people, loss of land, 
deforestation, loss of natural resources, and above all else, change in the daily life and 
livelihood of the people who inhabit the Irrawaddy region. 
 
8.3 The Conundrum of Neocolonial Power 
Myanmar’s dam projects, with the multiple layers of involvement and 
entanglements with China, raise new questions about the complex issues that befall 
underdeveloped, resource-rich nations in dealing with technologically-advanced, 
politically-sophisticated, resource-seeking neighbors.   In many regards, the issues are as 
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old as history itself: the perennial challenge that occurs when the desires of a mighty 
group, with resource needs, become fixed on the availability of resources, in the territory 
of a weaker group.  By whatever name, colonialism has examples that range from the 
beginnings of recorded history to present times (Fischer 2013). 
In early times, these acquisitions often took the form of conquest and outright 
subjugation of the local population. In the age of exploration, the methods might have 
been more restrained and tempered by distance, yet typically resulted in widespread 
immigration to establish a more-advanced, occupying foreign power in a new land. As 
transportation, diplomacy and commerce advanced, the same goals were accomplished by 
negotiation in barter, in trade arrangements or in treaties.  Yet, in the final analysis, the 
net effect was similar and could be accurately characterized as “economic exchange 
between core (rich) and periphery (poor) countries,” a defining feature of the dependency 
school of thought advanced by Andre Gunder Frank (Reid-Henry 2012).  
The significance of these theoretical models is to provide a lens through which it 
is possible to understand and to interpret key aspects of the contemporary wave of 
resource appropriation around the globe.  While these incursions of technologically-
advanced interests into resource-rich undeveloped nations can mask as the infusion of 
progress into a poor region, rarely is the equation that simple or egalitarian.  Indeed, the 
recent political profile of Myanmar easily begs the question of which of the governing 
groups has been in a position to profit from the close ties to China and its quest of 
hydroelectric power.  As has been observed in countless other cases of resource 
extraction in undeveloped nations, the exploitation of poor countries by rich ones is 
  51 
possible only because the ruling elites in poor countries have something to gain (Reid-
Henry 2012).  
While favorite theories and various analytical tools of the social scientist wax and 
wane on the international political and economic scene, the challenges of uneven starting 
points – between highly-developed nations and undeveloped regions – remain.  The 
inherent structural disparities in the ascendency of global capitalism continue unabated.  
These disparities lie at the heart of the challenges now facing Myanmar as it must come 
to terms with the Irrawaddy River dam projects and both the intended and the unintended 
consequences.  
One of the clear perspectives gaining traction in this discussion is application of 
the resource curse, as understood as the social, political and economic challenges of 
natural resource wealth (NRGI 2015)  While this has most often been applied to 
resources of oil-, gas- or mineral-rich countries, the application of this model is equally 
relevant to the region of a great river, such as the Irrawaddy, which holds in its steady 
water discharge, its remarkable length and its accessible terrain, the potential for massive 
quantities of hydroelectric power when dammed.  And, much like the impact of the 
depletion index always present in the extraction of a finite natural resource (oil, gas, 
mineral), the massive changes wrought by damming of a great river (population 
relocation, deforestation, fish and wildlife changes, habitat, herd and agriculture losses) 
must be understood and calculated as a significant measure of the risk/reward or 
cost/benefit analysis of such a behemoth undertaking.    
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The fact of the matter is that China’s proposal for various hydroelectric power 
projects along the Irrawaddy basin can be characterized as an issue of colonialization on 
the modern scale. From any perspective, it is within the data to see this as a case study for 
power-hungry and dominant counties investing time, energy, and money into developing 
countries for the sake of subjugating most, if not all, of their major resources. The home 
country sees the impending effects on all sides of the spectrum: socially, politically, 
economically, and physically, whether it is in the immediate or far future.  
 
8.4 Future Analyses  
Given the complexities and the inalterable changes inherent in these large dam 
projects, scientists and social scientists alike must apply their expertise and the tools of 
their disciplines to thorough analyses of these factors.  The imperatives for this level of 
study are not new.  However, as the requirements of clean energy production rises 
exponentially to address the ever-mounting demands of global technology, the country or 
the region of the globe with the highest energy access will have a substantial advantage in 
every measurable scale.  As the appetite for clean energy grows, the urgency and critical 
importance of increasingly precise models for assessing the consequences of major 
projects – especially those affecting massive changes across a large geographical range, 
with inherent geopolitical consequences – will grow exponentially. This is the 
consummate lesson that Myanmar and the many challenges of the Irrawaddy River dam 
projects have to teach the world. 
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